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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to quiet title to mineral rights 
in certain real property located in Rich County, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Rich County granted a Default 
Certificate against all defendants except Appellant LOIS 
S. COOK, who alone appeared and answered; granted Summary 
Judgment for Plaintiffs upon Plaintiffs' Motion; and is-
sued a Decree of Quiet Title confirming title to the dis-
puted mineral rights in Plaintiffs. From this Summary 
Judgment and Decree, Defendant LOIS S. COOK appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Summary Judgment 
below, and a remand to the District Court for a trial by 
jury on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It must first be emphasized that the instant dispuU 
a· c 
concerns mineral rights only; there is no dispute regar in 
surface rights. [CT 349.] In fact, the Title Opinion sub-
mitted on behalf of Plaintiffs reports that the surface 
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rights of all lands under examination vest solely and 
exclusively in Defendant LOIS S. COOK. [CT 166.] 
To determine the status of the mineral rights, a 
scrutiny of the relative claim of title is essential. 
In regard to the disputed lands, the Title Opinion sub-
mitted by Plaintiffs shows that these lands, originally 
the property of the United States, were conveyed to the 
State of Utah without any reservation of mineral rights. 
[CT 16 7. ) These lands were similarly conveyed by the 
State of Utah to individual owners without any reservation 
of mineral rights. [CT 167.) 
Thus, pursuant to Patent No. 15259, dated March 12, 
1931, some 272.88 acres were granted to Joseph E. Hatch 
and Co. [CT238.) Similarly, on that same date, pursuant 
to Patent No. 15260, some 80 acres were granted to Joseph 
E. Hatch and Ezra T. Hatch. [CT 250.) 
Subsequently, by a deed executed April 1, 1941, 
Joseph E. Hatch and his wife Katie Hatch attempted to 
convey the described lands to their four daughters. 
[CT 245.) One searches the record in vain, however, for 
any record of a conveyance of the 272.88 acre tract, or 
any part thereof, by the original private grantee, Joseph 
E. Hatch and Co.. Similarly, one searches the record in 
vain for any evidence of a conveyance of the 80 acre tract, 
or any part thereof, by the original private grantee, 
~o~eph E. Hatch and Ezra T. Hatch. 
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By a deed dated April 25, 1947, the four Hatch 
daughters conveyed all the lands subject to dispute 
herein to one Aden W. Thornock. 
By a deed dated June 30, 1950, Aden W. Thornock 
and his wife Lucille conveyed the subject property with 
the exception of a 40 acre tract, to one Lawrence B. 
Johnson. [CT 7.] 
By a deed dated December 1, 1952, Lawrence B. 
Johnson and his wife Lois L. Johnson conveyed the subject 
property, with the exception of the same forty acre tract, 
to Howland J. Cook and Lois S. Cook, husband and wife, 
"Reserving to the grantees herein all coal, oil and other 
minerals as may have been granted in the original patents 
to the above described land." [RT 8, emphasis added.] 
By deed dated May 21, 1958, the apparent omission 
of the 80 acre tract in the two previous conveyances was 
cured by its conveyance from Aden W. Thornock and Lucille 
J. Thornock to Howland J. Cook and Lois S. Cook, his wi~, 
as joint tenants, "for the sum of one dollar." [CT 277.J 
Finally, Plaintiffs have presented a document which 
purports to be a "Quitclaim Deed for Coal, Oil and other 
Minerals" from Howland Cook and Lois Cook to Aden w. 
Thornock. [ 3 pages, attached as "Exhibit One" to the 
deposition of LOIS S. COOK, and part of the instant record 
on appeal.] Given the crucial role assumed by this docurnen: 
in the decision of the trial court [RT 389; 377], it warran: 
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the closest scrutiny on the part of this honorable Supreme 
Court. In particular, the following facts merit notice: 
(a} One of the alleged grantors, Howland Cook, 
died on July 21, 1975 [per death certificate, RT 305), 
some two and a half years before the instant matter 
was filed below; 
(b} There is a marked contrast between the first and 
second pages of the alleged quitclaim deed: page one 
contains the description of the properties allegedly 
conveyed on stationery leaving in print the name of 
the law firm of "Dahl and Sagers"; the second page 
contains exclusively the purported signatures of the 
alleged grantors, with no descriptive material, and 
on different stationery without any printed legend. 
(c} Page one of .the alleged quitclaim deed shows 
the insertion in pen of additional land, and this 
addition is purportedly validated with the initials 
of the deceased Mr. Cook, but without any date, and 
without any attempt of similar "validation" on the 
part of the other grantor, Mrs. Cook. 
(d} The only surviving co-granter, defendant and 
appellant LOIS s. COOK, has testified that she has 
no recollection of executing this purported quitclaim 
deed. [Cook deposition 28:17 - 29:1.) 
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ARGUMENT 
Point 1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, BECAUSE THE 
RECORD SHOWS THAT THERE ARE TRIABLE ISSUES OF 
FACT IN THIS CASE: 
A. THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THE PURPORTED QUITCLAIM 
DEED FROM DEFENDANT AND HER LATE HUSBA!W TO 
PLAINTIFFS' PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST IS OF 
QUESTIONABLE VALIDITY, BOTH ON ITS FACE AND 
IN THE LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF ITS EX-
ECUTION: THIS MERITS THE FULLER SCRUTINY OF 
A TRIAL ON THE MERITS; 
B. THE RECORD SIMILARLY CASTS SUBSTANTIAL DOUBT 
ON THE CLAIM OF TITLE TO THE REAL PROPERTY IN 
DISPUTE, AND SPECIFICALLY ON THE CONVEYANCE 
BY JOSEPH E. HATCH AND KATIE HATCH TO THE FOUR 
HATCH DAUGHTERS: IF THIS CONVEYANCE WAS DEFEC-
TIVE THEN IT WOULD APPEAR THAT DEFENDANT HOLDS 
TITLE TO THE REAL PROPERTY IN DISPUTE, NOT BY 
VIRTUE OF (AND SUBJECT TO THE LIMITING TERMS 
OF) ANY DEED, BUT BY OPERATION OF LAW THROUGH 
ADVERSE POSSESSION, TOTALLY AND WITHOUT ANY 
RESTRICTION. 
In the state of Utah the procedures for sununary judg-
ment in the District Court are set forth by Rule 56 of the 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The traditional advantage of the surrunary judgment 
has been described by the Utah Supreme Court as follows: 
... the granting of such a motion 
does have a salutary purpose in our 
procedure because it eliminates the 
time, trouble and expense of a trial ... 
Brandt v. Springville Banking Co., 
10 Utah 2d. 350, 353 P. 2d 460, 462 
( 1960) . 
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While a summary judgment may eliminate the "time 
trouble and expense" of a trial, it frequently will not 
eliminate the "time, trouble and expense" of an appeal. 
This should be particularly obvious to the Supreme Court 
of Utah. Utah has no intermediate appellate courts, and 
the summary judgments which save "time, trouble and ex-
pense" for the District Court, tend to have the opposite 
effect, directly and irnrnediately, upon the Supreme Court. 
It is not contended that justice cannot be done 
through a surrunary judgment. It is contended, however, that 
it is considerably less easy for justice to be seen to be 
done through summary judgment. The surrunary process is 
necessarily abortive. The thwarted plaintiff is surely 
entitled to a showing that the abortion was therapeutic. 
A one page Memorandum Decision [RT 349, 377] is not likely 
to achieve this. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has been sensitive to such 
considerations. Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity and 
Guaranty Insurance Underwriters Inc., 16 Utah 2d. 211, 
398 P. 2d 685 (1965), was a suit against an insurer. The 
District Court granted surrunary judgment for the defendant 
insurer, and the insured appealed. Reversing the judgment 
below, and remanding for trial, the Supreme Court repeated 
the received wisdom in these terms: 
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It is appropriate to reiterate that 
the dismissal of an action at pre-
trial, which peremptorily turns a 
party out of court, is a drastic 
action which should be used sparingly 
and with caution. 
Reliable Furniture, supra, 398 P.2d 
685, 688. 
The same court went on to elaborate: 
The summary disposal of a case serves 
a salutary purpose in avoiding the 
time, trouble and expense of a trial 
where it is justified. But unless it 
is clearly so, there are other evils 
to be guarded against. A party with 
a legitimate cause, but who is unable 
to afford an appeal, may be turned 
away without his day in court; or, 
when an appeal is taken, if a reversal 
results and a trial is ordered, the 
time, trouble and expense is increased 
rather than diminished. 
Reliable Furniture, supra, 398 P. 2d 
685, 688. 
Consequently, before a party shall be summarily deniec 
his day in court, 
His contentions as to the facts should 
be considered in the light most favor-
able to him, and only if it clearly 
appears that he could not establish a 
right to recovery under the law should 
such action be taken; and any doubts 
which exist should be resolved in favor 
of affording him the privileges of a 
trial. 
Reliable Furniture, supra, 
685, 688. 
398 P. 2d 
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The same approach was taken in an earlier case 
In Re Williams' Estates, Utah 2d. 83, 348 P.2d 683 (1960), 
where the plaintiff alleged she was the adopted child of 
the decedents, and claimed her share in their estates. 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the defendant administrators, and the alleged adoptee 
appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for 
trial: 
A summary judgment is proper only 
if the pleadings, depositions, af-
fidavits and admissions show that 
there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law. If the proof which plaintiff 
claims she can produce when considered 
in the light most favorable to her 
would reasonably justify a finding 
by clear and convincing evidence that 
there· was an agreement to adopt, then 
there is a genuine issue of material 
fact and the case must be reversed. 
We conclude that without giving plain-
tiff the opportunity to present her 
evidence in a trial we cannot hold 
as a matter of law that plaintiff is 
not entitled to recover. 
Williams' Estates, supra, 368 P.2d 
683, 685. 
Applying the above principles of Reliable Furniture, 
and of Williams' Estates, to the case at bar, the question 
for the court may be formulated as follows: Considering 
all the facts on record in the light most favorable to 
the defendant and appellant, LOIS s. COOK, and resolving 
cd l doubts in favor of affording her the privileges of a 
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trial, does it clearly appear that she could not establish 
a right to all or part of the mineral rights in those 
Rich County lands to which she indisputably holds sole 
title to the surface rights? 
This question can only be answered through a close 
scrutiny of the claim of title as set forth in the record 
and as summarized in the STATEMENT OF FACTS above, with 
specific forms on the two purported deeds which we shall 
now examine: the purported Cook - Thornock qui tclairn deed, 
and the purported Hatches (parents) - Hatches (4 daughters) 
deed. 
A. Cook - Thornock Quitclaim Deed: 
The record shows that this deed was central to the 
District Court's decision to render summary judgment for 
Plaintiffs. [RT 349, 377] 
A review of the record, however, shows that this deed 
creates more doubts than it solves. 
First we must examine the pleadings. In her second 
amended and sworn answer the defendant specifically denies 
executing this particular deed. [RT 3 8 0] • She further 
answers that if the deed is found to have been executed by 
her and her husband, that such execution was extorted 
through prolonged threats, coercion and duress. [RT 34Q]. 
· 11 · · by hand of a land Fina y, she alleges that the insertion 
description in the typed first page was done without her 
knowledge or consent. [RT 340]. 
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Nor does appellant's case stand on these pleadings 
alone. The intrinsic qualities of the deed on its face 
unequivocally tend to lend color to the defendant's answer 
and allegations. Thus, in our STATEMENT OF FACTS, we have 
underlined the marked contrast between pages one and two, 
where page two bears signatures only, could thus be at-
tached to ~ny document, and is in fact attached to a 
first page which demonstrably uses a different quality 
of paper. Defendant's answer is similarly consistent 
with the self evident fact that after the original land 
descriptions were typed on page one, a further sector 
was added in ink. Thus addition purportedly was endorsed 
by the initials of defendant's husband. He, however, is 
long since dead, and no such endorsement by defendant 
is shown. 
Further corroboration is provided by defendant's 
depositions. The record shows that defendant is an el-
derly widow [Deposition 8:20-25], who was deposed by two 
attorneys: Jensen and Axland. Jensen was polite and 
solicit~us in his interrogation [Deposition 4:6-11; 9:21-
23; 24:22]; Axland was abusive and threatening [Deposition 
42:1-4; 44:4-13; 44:25; 46:15-17; Jensen than returned to 
interrogate politely [Deposition 57:7-9]. Despite this 
blatant cold-hot-cold technique, the defendant kept 
repeating that she had no recollection of having executed 
the deed [Deposition 9:19-20], and that a paper she had 
executed was executed solely because she and her husband 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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instrument was purportedly executed, 1959, the statute 
of limitations had not finished running so as to vest 
title by adverse possession in appellant. 
Furthermore, where, as here, a purported quitclaim 
deed is involved, the overwhelming weight of authority 
is that the after-acquired title does not vest in the 
grantee. 26 C.J.S. "Deeds" §ll8 at 948 (1956). It is 
clear that this rule is followed in Utah. The effect 
of a quitclaim deed is codified in Utah Code Ann. §57-
1-13 (1953): 
Conveyances of land may ... be sub-
stantially in the following form: 
quit-claim deed. 
Such deed when executed as required 
by law shall have the effect of a 
conveyance of all right, title, in-
terest and estate of the grantor in 
and to the premises therein descri-
bed and all rights, privileges and 
appurtenances thereunto belonging, 
at the date of such conveyance. 
Two cases in Utah make clear that a quit-claim deed 
does not trigger the after-acquired title doctrine. In 
Duncan v. Hemmelwright, 112 Utah 262, 186 P. 2d 965 
(1947) the court held that the plaintiff did not acguirt 
title to real estate under the doctrine of after-acguir~ 
title, where the county acquired the title to the real 
estate after having executed a quit-claim deed to a coal 
The 
company under which the plaintiff derived his claim. 
court based its decision on the theory that a quit-cla~ 
deed does not convey an after-acquired title. The relevr Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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facts of the instant Cook case fit it into the Duncan 
reasoning. Mrs. Cook executed a quit-claim deed to the 
mineral rights and it was not until many years later 
that her claim by adverse possession of the mineral rights 
ripened into title, the doctrine of after-acquired title 
will not operate since a mere quit-claim deed was in-
volved. 
In Dowse v. Kammerman, 122 Utah 85, 246 P. 2d 881 
(1952) the court affirms that the doctrine of after-ac-
quired title is inapplicable where a quit-claim is in-
volved. The court quotes the following language from 
Breen v. Morehead, 126 S.W. 650, 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910): 
* * * where there is in the deed an 
express or implied representation 
that the grantor at the time of his 
conveyance'was possessed of the title 
which his deed purports to convey, if 
such representation is false, whether 
he committed a fraud or was acting 
under an honest mistake, he is estop-
ped from denying that he has a title; 
and, consequently, if he afterwards . 
acquire the title, he cannot by.s7tt1ng 
it up defeat his own grant. (C1 ting 
cases.) But if the deed conveys 'all 
rights, title, and interest' of the 
grantor, instead of an absolute estate, 
the grantor will not be estopped from 
setting up an after-acquired title, 
since he did not undertake to convey 
a greater interest, or better title 
than he then had. (Ci ting cases.) 
at 882. 
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It thus appears that the questions raised by the 
purported Hatch deed [CT 245], and by its impact on 
the subsequent record title history, are sufficiently 
grave to require a thorough ventilation at trial. A 
summary judgment in the context of such complexity as 
demonstrated was premature, and warrants setting aside 
by this honorable court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, appellant prays 
this honorable court to set aside the summary judgment 
below, together with the decree of quiet title, and ~ 
remand the entire matter for a trial on the merits in 
the District Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
___ ,,,. 
A torney for Appellant. 
March 20, 1979 
I certify that on the above date two copies of t~ 
above Brief were personally delivered to LeRoy S. Axland, 
Attorney for Plaintiff--Respondent, 36 South Main Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147. 
/ j . 
I I---:-
. \ . I 
N 
Appellant. 
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